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Abstract The article sets forth Ronald Dworkin’s efforts to avert the slavery of the talented
within his theory of equality, so that they are not forced to work full-time at one type of job,
but then criticises Dworkin for failing to apply similar concerns to not so talented workers.
It argues that he overlooks the problem of the slavery of the not so talented that results from
the tough rules he proposes for dealing with insurance payouts. Finally, it tries to show how
this unfairness can be avoided with a better interpretation of the likely outcome of his
hypothetical insurance experiment given a better understanding of the motivations of parties
operating within that experiment.
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Like other resource egalitarians, Ronald Dworkin is troubled by the problem of the slavery
of the talented. This occurs when an attempt to mitigate the influence of unequal talents on
the distribution of income suggests enslaving the talented so that their talents can be put to
work for the not so talented. In order to avoid the slavery of the talented Dworkin argues
that talents should not be included in an initial auction for worldly resources. For the same
reason he thinks that hypothetical insurance premiums against lack of talent should not be
based on potential earnings but fixed as an increasing proportion of actual income.
However, when it comes to insurance payouts the proposal is to tie coverage to potential
earnings rather than actual income. The consequence of these tough rules on payouts is that
the not so talented face restricted occupational choices. I try to show how this consequence
can be avoided once a more complete inventory of the possible motivations of parties to the
hypothetical insurance scenario has been taken. Finally, I try to work through the
implications of this argument for debates in political theory and welfare policy.
1 The Auction
One of the most discussed features of Dworkin’s theory of equality is the idea that the
government should try, so far as it is able, to make the distribution of income and wealth in
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society sensitive to people’s choices and ambitions (including decisions about whether to work
inmore or less productive ways andwhether or not to purchase insurance against risk) but at the
same time not sensitive to people’s native endowments (or talents) and uninsurable risks (such
as being born with a handicap) (Dworkin 1981, p. 311; 1985, p. 207). Of course, in reality
people start off with greater or lesser shares of worldly resources and in some cases are born
with handicaps that they might have wished to purchase insurance against but cannot. Indeed,
the rich are able to purchase insurance packages that are simply not available to the poor
(1981, p. 311; 2006, p. 115). So Dworkin employs a thought experiment of people
shipwrecked on a desert island (1981, p. 285). They are placed under conditions of ex ante
equality, meaning they are given equal numbers of clamshells with which to bid for an equal
share of the island’s natural resources, and are given ample opportunity to purchase insurance
against equal risks, including physical handicaps and lack of talent.
If one of the goals of egalitarian justice is to mitigate the influence of talent-
endowment on the distribution of income after the auction, why not include people’s
talents or labour-power within the initial auction itself? Dworkin declines this
alternative on the following grounds. Suppose Adrian and Claude possess unequal
talent for production such that either Adrian is able to engage in skilful farming and
Claude is not or both can engage in skilful farming but Adrian will produce far more
resources than Claude with the same degree of effort. Since Adrian ‘is able to produce
prodigious income from farming, others would be willing to bid a large amount to have
the right to his labor and the vegetables thereof, and if he outbids them, but chooses to
write indifferent poetry instead of farming full-time, he will have spent a large share of
his [clamshells] on a right that will bring him little benefit’ (Dworkin 1981, p. 311). For
Dworkin, ‘This is indeed the slavery of the talented’ (p. 312).
Nominally, what makes auction-slavery unjust, in Dworkin’s eyes, is the fact that such
results are forbidden by ‘the envy test’. According to the envy test: ‘No division of
resources is an equal division if, once the division is complete, any immigrant would prefer
someone else’s bundle of resources to his own bundle’ (Dworkin 1981, p. 285). It is
important to recognise that the envy test is not supposed to be static: if someone chooses to
work hard to expand his worldly resources, the relevant question is not whether other
people would envy his worldly resources but whether they would envy his worldly
resources plus the talent and effort he must expend to obtain those worldly resources.
Nevertheless, if Adrian is regarded as owning his own talents and whatever his labour-
power enables him to produce, then Claude is likely to envy Adrian’s bundle of worldly
resources and talents. If, on the other hand, Adrian is put in a position of having to purchase
his own talents or labour-power from the auction, then he might end up envying Claude’s
situation. This is because Adrian, unlike Claude, will have to spend most, if not all, of his
clamshells in purchasing his own labour-power or else let other people own his labour-
power and all his income (1981, p. 312).1
Dworkin’s case against the inclusion of talents in the auction must also be understood in
the context of his wider reconciliation of equality and liberty. Isaiah Berlin famously argued
that there are a number of fundamental political values (including equality and liberty),
which can, and often do, conflict to give contrary directives in matters of political morality
(Berlin 1969). This, of course, leaves the difficult task of trying to establish which values
are to be promoted or sacrificed at any given time. Nevertheless, Berlin believed that it is
better to be a pluralist fox than a monist hedgehog (1978, p. 22). Dworkin, by contrast,
1 For further discussion of this point, see Miriam Cohen Christofidis (2004) pp. 33–4 and Dworkin (2004)
p. 351.
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rejects value pluralism arguing instead that it is possible to reconcile equality and liberty
once we understand the true nature of each. He affirms that equality and liberty are not ‘flat’
concepts but ‘dynamic’ concepts (Dworkin 1987, 2001). This means that the citizens of a
true political community do not have a right to every freedom or every equal distribution
possible. On the contrary, citizens are only entitled to specific kinds of rights to do or not do
things and specific kinds of rights to equal distribution, where specific rights must be
grounded in more general principles of political morality. In order to establish specific
rights to equality and liberty Dworkin maintains that we need only recognise an abstract
egalitarian principle that we are all united in accepting, vis-à-vis, that every citizen has a
right to be treated with equal concern and respect by his or her own government (1977,
p. 180; 1983, pp. 24–25; 1986, pp. 296–7; 1987, pp. 7–8; 2000, p. 2). If this abstract
egalitarian principle overarches more specific rights to equality and liberty, then there
cannot be genuine conflict between specific rights qua adequate interpretations of the
abstract egalitarian principle (1987, p. 9).
How does this general argument about equality and liberty apply in the case of the
slavery of the talented? Anyone who accepts the abstract right to equal concern and respect
accepts only as much equality and liberty as this right implies or can be plausibly
interpreted as implying. According to Dworkin’s interpretation, within a true political
community each citizen has a right to an equal share of resources and enough liberty as is
necessary to be able to identify and realise the intrinsic value of his or her own life
(Dworkin 1977, pp. 272–3; 2006, p. 10). And the basic thought is that being enslaved by an
auction for one’s own talents is in direct opposition to having satisfactory liberty with
which to identify and realise the intrinsic value of one’s own life. Hence, anyone who
affirms a kind of specific right to equality of resources which entails the slavery of the
talented must reject the abstract right to equal concern and respect, for to allow the slavery
of the talented is to deny a specific right to liberty that flows from that abstract right.
Assuming this interpretation of the abstract egalitarian principle is correct it provides one
line of response to those who would argue that auction-slavery is not really slavery after all.
In the case of the chattel slave, he is owned lock, stock and barrel from the moment of his
birth, whereas the auction-slave (so the argument goes) is merely required to make a choice
between either bidding for his own talents and thereby giving up other consumption or having
his talents owned by others in which case he cannot expect much leisure. If tastes about
consumption, work and leisure are amenable to the agent’s own control, then what looks like
the enslavement of the talented under the auction is really a kind of responsibility-attracting
expensive taste (Stark 2002, pp. 46–7). However, if the above interpretation of equal concern
and respect is correct, then the ability to make an occupational choice between different types
of work whilst maintaining decent levels of consumption and leisure is part and parcel of
having satisfactory liberty with which to identify and realise the intrinsic value of one’s own
life, and is something to which individuals have a specific right.
2 The Hypothetical Insurance Scenario
Given the foregoing arguments, how does Dworkin think that can we move towards
equality of resources without putting talents directly into the auction? He asks us to imagine
that the shipwreck survivors face the same antecedent risks of lacking the talent to earn at
different levels of income and are offered the possibility of purchasing talent or income-
maintenance insurance. They can choose between schemes that determine the relevant
insurance premiums in one of two ways: either flat rate premiums (charged at fixed
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amounts depending on the chosen level of insurance coverage and payable at those amounts
whatever the policyholder actually turns out to earn) or variable rate premiums (charged as
an increasing percentage of the income that the policyholder actually turns out to earn).
Having reflected on the level and type of insurance coverage that the islanders would
choose, on average, under conditions of ex ante equality, Dworkin affirms that we have at
our disposal an appropriate baseline for judging the justice or otherwise of social welfare
provision in the real world (Dworkin 1981, pp. 290, 315; 2002, p. 107; 2006, p. 115–7).2
The spectre of talent enslavement has not entirely gone away, however. Dworkin argues
that if the survivors opted for flat rate insurance policies, they would be unlikely to want to
purchase insurance at the highest level of coverage. For suppose someone did decide to
purchase insurance at the highest possible level of coverage, with the highest premiums
payable, and then ends up losing the insurance bet because it just so happens that his movie
star talents are highly valued on the island. He could not earn enough to pay his premiums
if he opted to work as an administrator, mechanic or any number of less well-paid jobs. In
fact, according to Dworkin:
Only one form of work, and full-time, will be likely to produce the income needed to
pay the premium that is now his albatross. So his penalty has special welfare
disadvantages not measurable in ordinary financial terms. It is these that make it
appropriate to speak of enslavement. (Dworkin 1981, p. 322; cf. 2002, pp. 128–9)3
Does Dworkin’s use of the phrase ‘special welfare disadvantages’ reveal that he is
relying on some variety of welfare metric to make his case and is thereby conceding the
inadequacy of the resource metric? The short answer is no. The phrase refers to the reasons
or motivations that the shipwreck survivors would have not to purchase high coverage
under a flat rate scheme, to wit, that doing so could enslave them. Although the purpose of
the hypothetical insurance question is to realise equality of resources, this does not rule as
inadmissible lines of reasoning about the motivations of insurance purchasers including the
special welfare disadvantage of becoming enslaved. In other words, Dworkin might involve
welfare in the story about why persons would purchase one level and type of cover rather
than another but this does not mean that the account is grounded in some prior conception
of equality of welfare (Dworkin 1981b, p. 335).
By using the term ‘enslavement’ to characterise the insurance scenario Dworkin harks
back to the above-mentioned auction scenario, where slavery would ensue if labour-power
were included within the initial auction of worldly resources. However, there are important
dissimilarities between auction-slavery and insurance-slavery. In the event that the auction-
slave does not bid or bids unsuccessfully for his talents he forfeits the ownership of his
talents and must work as directed by the eventual owners. The insurance-slave is in a
different situation. He must work if he is to pay his premiums, but his labour-power is not
the property of someone else. He has the right not to work if he wishes; what he does not
have the right to do is not pay his premiums. Putting this another way, although the
insurance company is entitled to take action against someone who refuses to earn enough to
2 Marc Fleurbaey objects that this method of basing actual policies on average hypothetical decisions violates
the separateness of persons (Fleurbaey 2002, p. 90). For a critical discussion, see Brown (2009b) pp. 67–9.
3 Dworkin implies that under the fixed rate system enslavement will only affect those who gamble on the
highest level of coverage. But Daniel Markovits has calculated that purchasing insurance coverage even at
the mean level of income in the projected range will carry the risk of enslavement. See Markovits (2003) pp.
2308–9. For an interesting discussion of Markovits, see Vincent (2006).
Drawing on similar reasons Dworkin also rejects Robert van der Veen’s proposal of a 100% flat rate tax
(van der Veen 2002; Dworkin 2002, pp. 128–9).
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pay his premiums—either to collect the premiums he owes or to recoup at least some of its
losses—other things remaining equal it would not have the right to force policyholders to
work. Furthermore, there is a sense in which someone who chooses to purchase high
insurance coverage and loses the bet (i.e. ‘must’ work at full stretch at one type of job in
order to pay off flat rate insurance premiums) is a slave to his own gamble rather than to
someone else. In other words, the reason why we are willing to regard auction-slavery as a
possible infringement of liberty is that the decision to place talent or labour-power in the
auction is not made by the persons concerned. The insurance-slave, by contrast, is in the
position of choosing whether or not to gamble on a policy that could enslave him. If he
gambles and loses, then the result is bad option luck.4
More generally, that Dworkin introduces option luck into the picture testifies to the
depth of his opposition to Nozick’s memorable argument in Anarchy, State, and Utopia that
income taxation is on a par with forced labour (Nozick 1974, p. 169). Whereas Nozick’s
argument extends to all types and levels of redistributive income taxation (as in, the
taxation of earnings from labour used for the purposes of inter-personal redistribution as
opposed to funding national defence, the police, and the public administration of justice),
Dworkin affirms that income taxation is not unjust provided that it mimics the type and
level of insurance premium that would be selected by persons placed under conditions of ex
ante equality. Dworkin favours a proportional taxation system. Nozick, on the other hand,
believes that a proportional taxation system (under which individuals still have freedom of
choice over how much work they do and what type) is on a par with forced labour because
it violates people’s private property rights.
At any rate, Dworkin goes on to argue that most of the island insurance companies would
offer, and most of the shipwreck survivors would want to purchase, variable rate insurance
policies in which premiums are charged as an increasing proportion of the income the
policyholder actually turns out to earn. People would prefer a ‘bet’, in other words, under which
the percentage of income they pay in premiums rises and falls with their actual income
(Dworkin 1981, p. 325). In order to pay a reduced rate in insurance premiums the policyholder
need only prove reduced actual earnings. ‘If we modelled our tax structure on the hypothetical
insurance story,’ explains Dworkin, ‘we would insist on a fairly steep progressive tax-rate
system so that those with more income would pay at a higher rate’ (2006, p. 117).
In contrast to this, Dworkin suggests that insurance payouts would be triggered only on
the basis of shortfalls on the side of earning potential as opposed to deficits in actual
earnings. That is to say, ‘the insurance company will pay the policyholder the difference
between that coverage level and the income he does in fact have an opportunity to earn’
(Dworkin 1981, p. 317). A shortfall between a policyholder’s actual income and his or her
insured income will not be enough to trigger a payout. What matters is the gap between
what policyholders have the opportunity to earn or potential income and the level of insured
income. In fact, Dworkin conjectures that most insurance companies would place the
burden of proof on policyholders because of the administrative savings this will produce.
The sort of evidence a policyholder could be required to bring to bear is evidence that he or
she has tried and failed to secure a job at the agreed level of coverage or that he or she lacks
the skills and talents required to earn at that level. Some insurers might even require
policyholders to pursue job training as a condition of receiving any payouts. In this way
policyholders must prove that their lack of employment or low pay is due to lack of talent
4 Faced with the problem of people whose lives would be ruined by these sorts of unwise insurance bets,
Dworkin concedes that we may have ‘special reasons for forbidding certain forms of gambles’ (Dworkin
1981, p. 295).
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rather than lack of effort or training. Unless the policyholder can prove otherwise, the
insurer proceeds on the basis that he or she has the capacity to earn at the agreed level of
coverage. If there is evidence to show lack of talent at that level, the insurer retreats to a
lower percentile, and agrees to pay the difference between the two. The onus of proof then
reverts back to the policyholder, to prove that he or she cannot earn at this lower level. This
process continues until the policyholder is no longer willing or able to show that he or she
is incapable of earning at a particular level (1981, p. 326; 2000, p. 336).
Why does Dworkin think that this type of insurance policy would be popular? The main
reason appears to be that it would be cheaper than its alternatives. He thinks that by
imposing strict rules on insurance payouts insurers will be able to make significant savings
and pass on at least part of the savings to policyholders as inducements to purchase the
relevant policies rather than more expensive alternatives. The savings come from the fact
that insurance is not triggered merely if an agent earns below the insured amount, so in
principle fewer payments will have to be made, and because the onus of proof is on the
policyholder to provide evidence, thereby saving the insurer the administrative costs of
gathering that evidence. If governments modelled social welfare provision on this part of
the hypothetical insurance story, they would insist on a strict system of interviews,
eligibility assessments, and work or retraining requirements such that citizens who could
not prove their inability to earn at a specified income level would not receive assistance
even if their actual earnings fell below that level.
3 Comparing the Rules on Insurance Premiums and Payouts
How might these different rules impact on hypothetical policyholders? Imagine that on the
island variable rate insurance premiums are charged as an increasing percentage of actual
earnings according to the following bands: bandA at 25% of income for people in the first to the
thirtieth income percentiles, band B at 50% of income for people in the thirty-first to the sixtieth
income percentiles, and band C at 75% of income for people in the sixty-first to the
one-hundredth income percentiles. Now suppose that two of the shipwreck survivors, Jane and
John, both choose to purchase insurance coverage at the thirtieth income percentile, which they
reasonably predict as being necessary for maintaining a decent standard of living (taking into
account the cost of the insurance premiums). It turns out that Jane actually has the talent to earn
at the eightieth income percentile, well above the insured level. Although she is unable to claim
an insurance payout, she nevertheless enjoys real freedom of occupation. If she decided to earn
at her maximum potential income level, she would have to pay premiums at a rate of 75% of
income. But if she reduces her earnings by taking up less well-paid employment, she could pay
at a reduced rate of 50% of income. She could even choose to work part-time and still earn at the
thirtieth percentile paying a rate of 25% of income. The upshot is that Jane is free to accept a
wide variety of different jobs andwork below her maximum earning capacity whilst at the same
time enjoying a decent standard of living. John, by contrast, turns out to have the talents
required to earn at the covered level of income but no higher. Hewill pay a premium rate of 25%
of income whatever he earns. Furthermore, since he is able to earn the covered amount, no
insurance payout will be triggered by any reduction in his actual earnings. So if he chooses not
to work at full stretch or not to employ his most valuable talents, he will earn a salary below the
thirtieth income percentile. The consequence is that John is unfree to work fewer hours or
accept a less well-paid job whilst maintaining a decent standard of living.
Now Dworkin suggests that ‘if the imagined conditions of the hypothetical insurance
device were actually met, prudent people, at least on average, would take out policies of
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unemployment or low-wage insurance to guarantee a decent standard of living but would
not insure to provide as much as the average pre-insurance level of income in their
community’ (Dworkin 2002, pp. 125–6). I believe that the problem I have identified is
particularly acute at this level. For, it is at this level that earning less than the insured
amount can have the most significant impact on someone’s ability to make ends meet.
Someone with John’s talents will have limited real freedom of choice about the general
character and quality of work in which he engages and almost no real choice about the mix
of work and leisure that he might prefer. He lacks real choice in the specific sense that
dropping below his maximum earning potential will send him below the level of a decent
standard of living.5 This invites the criticism that Dworkin’s description of the insurance
scheme does not consistently cater to real freedom of occupation and thereby discriminates
unfairly between the talented and the not so talented.
Let me be clear about the nature of this criticism. I have used the notions of real freedom
of occupation and a decent standard of living in order to highlight the unequal predicament
of not so talented workers. Consequently, some might have the suspicion that, in the end, I
subscribe to an equality of welfare account or perhaps an equality of opportunity account—
which are defensible, of course, but not compatible with Dworkin’s account. This is not my
position, however. The point is that equality of resources is defined by a decision over the
purchase of income maintenance insurance under conditions of ex ante equality. Typically,
people will consider various things in coming to such a decision, including, I propose,
concerns about real freedom of occupation. Nevertheless, I do not make the further claim
that the primary aim of egalitarian justice should be to equalise real freedom of occupation
or access to the good life or equality of opportunity for welfare broadly construed. My aim,
by contrast, is merely to reflect more deeply on what is likely to occur if persons are placed
under conditions of ex ante equality, as defined by resource-based measures. The moral of
my story is that people can have reasons not to purchase a scheme that leaves them with
limited real freedom of occupation, a conclusion which is, I believe, compatible with
Dworkin’s general account.
How might Dworkin respond to my argument about the unforeseen consequences of his
proposed rules for insurance payouts? Consider two possible replies. The first denies that
tough rules dealing with insurance payouts detract from freedom of occupation properly
called. On this view, John is free to earn less than his maximum potential income for the
simple reason that nobody is coercing him to work at his full capacity. Nor is he forced to
work at his full capacity in order to pay high fixed rate insurance premiums. Though this
reply merits attention it is not decisive. What is at stake here is people’s real freedom of
occupation, where this means the opportunity to choose between different kinds of work
and combinations of work and leisure but at the same time maintain a decent standard of
living. Putting the point another way, we might say that occupational choice against a
background of consumption and leisure is an intrinsic component of virtually all
conceptions of the good life (see van Parijs 1995; Levine 1998). I do not claim that tough
rules dealing with insurance payouts can enslave policyholders in exactly the same way that
fixed rate premiums might enslave policyholders. But I do claim that it is wrong to suppose
that the former is not a form of unfreedom or somehow irrelevant from the point of view of
5 It might be thought that even if John is stuck, so to speak, working at his maximum earning potential, he
nevertheless enjoys a greater variety of types of jobs at this lower level of income than at a higher level (cf.
Dworkin 1981, p. 322). But this is far from obvious. Although John may have a choice of jobs, he could still
lack any real choice in the type of occupation since at this level most jobs are likely to involve the same high
degree of routine, non-complex, restricted-autonomy labour.
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justice. The key question is whether or not individuals have a right to real freedom of
occupation. On Dworkin’s view, this depends on what it means to show equal concern and
respect in matters of distribution, where this interpretation depends in turn on the
hypothetical insurance device. I conjecture that persons would be inclined to purchase
insurance policies that furnish them with a degree of real freedom of occupation, and
therefore that individuals have a right to real freedom of occupation. I should perhaps also
clarify that when I talk of a lack of real freedom of occupation I do not mean any limitation
on choice of occupation. Presumably no sensible scheme would grant people the real
freedom of occupation to do jobs for which they are not competent. It would be
inappropriate, for example, to regard someone as lacking liberty of occupation merely
because the relevant authorities do not permit unqualified people to work as surgeons.
The second reply is that even if a person loses the insurance bet in the sense that I have
just described, he is still very little worse off than if he had taken out no insurance
whatsoever (cf. Dworkin 1981, pp. 322–3). Even at relatively low levels of coverage,
however, it is difficult to make the case that someone is very little worse off than if he had
taken out no insurance whatsoever. There is one clear sense in which he is worse off. If he
had not been insured, then at least he would not now have to pay insurance premiums. If he
chooses to earn below his potential, John still has to pay premiums at a rate of 25% of
income, and with the tough rules dealing with insurance payouts he would receive no
payouts to counterbalance the premiums. More importantly, he is worse off than if the
insurance policy had been different, that is, if the policy had been based on actual earnings
and paid out even if he opted to earn less than the insured amount. So why not use this as
the baseline? In the absence of an answer to this question the reply lacks force.
4 Reinterpreting the Insurance Scenario
In the light of the above I propose to rethink the motivations of the shipwreck survivors.
Dworkin takes it as read that most, if not all, of the agents would opt for the least expensive type
of insurance policy. The assumption is that agents are motivated principally by cheaper
premiums, so that every penny an individual can save on insurance premiums is a penny he can
spend on something else that really matters to him. But is that true? Suppose some firms offer
no-talent-test insurance whereby the policy is triggered as soon as actual earnings fall below the
covered level rather than if potential income falls below. Will anyone want to buy this type of
insurance? I do not deny that the answer to this question will depend on the rates of the relevant
premiums, which in turn depends on projections about what people could earn, how many of
them would choose to earn less than they could earn if insurance payouts were more readily
obtainable, and the administrative savings that could be made if insurance firms did not have to
assess evidence on earning potential. However, even assuming that no-talent-test insurance
policies would bemore expensive than the alternatives,6 there are a number of possible reasons
why people might favour this type of policy.
As we have already seen, some might want the real freedom of occupation this type of
insurance will provide. They will want to have an insurance policy that allows them to
6 I assume that if the insurance premiums associated with these policies are higher at lower levels of income,
say, 30% of income for those earning in the first to the thirtieth income percentiles, then people will have to
insure at a higher level of coverage in order to maintain a decent standard of living. Alternatively, insurance
companies could leave band A at 25% but adjust band C to capture people earning in the fiftieth income
percentile and/or introduce a new band, D, say, 90% of income for earners in the eightieth income percentile
and above.
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work at less than full stretch at different types of jobs, for at least part of their working life,
without forfeiting a decent standard of living, and they will be willing to pay extra for it. In
order to make this case we do not have to assume that they are buying insurance simply to
become idlers. Some might want the real freedom to take time off work so they can pursue
their religious commitments or to undertake charity work or to fulfil some other deeply held
ambition. Other people might want to be able to work in less mundane jobs or jobs that
afford some creativity or the chance to work with young people or in the great outdoors.
Quite apart from issues of restricted occupational choice there are other drawbacks
associated with insurance schemes that tie payments to earning capacity rather than actual
earnings. One problem that has emerged in the liberal egalitarian literature is that such
regimes require potentially intrusive and demeaning investigations in the case of people
who really do lack the requisite capacities to earn at the insured level. Jonathan Wolff dubs
this the problem of ‘shameful revelation’ (Wolff 1998, pp. 113–5). Shipwreck survivors
might be put off by insurance policies that, in effect, require them to reveal things about
themselves that they could find shameful in order to trigger insurance payouts. They might
prefer instead to have a no-talent-test policy even if they have to accept higher premiums in
return. In fact, there is already a precedent for no-evidence policies within actual insurance
markets. Some life insurance companies promote products especially designed to cover
people above a certain age without the need for a medical. In some cases individuals are
prepared to pay a premium for their privacy. This does not mean that parties will be willing
to pay any amount. Rather, it suggests that an optimum balance is to be struck between the
desired cost and the desired type of coverage.
That it is possible to develop a wider set of assumptions regarding the motivations of
parties to Dworkin’s hypothetical insurance market is due to the fact that, unlike Rawls’ veil
of ignorance, the hypothetical insurance argument is designed to allow people ‘enough self-
knowledge, as individuals, to keep relatively intact their sense of their own personality, and
especially their theory of what is valuable in life’ (Dworkin 1981, p. 345). The assumptions
we make about the motivations of the participants, therefore, will depend on a set of
premises about what people actually think is valuable in life.
If Dworkin insists on hypothetical insurance markets as the correct device for fleshing
out principles of distributive justice, then any convincing arguments that can be made about
what types of insurance policies would be popular among the participants must be accepted
at face value. As Dworkin himself puts it,
If I am wrong in this, the hypothetical insurance argument would insist on radical
redistribution and substantial wealth equality. So the scheme would offer an argument
for that consequence, on that assumption. (Dworkin 1981, p. 319n.11)
Mine is not an argument for radical amounts of redistribution per se. Rather, it is that if a
compelling case can be made to the effect that people would, on average, prefer an
insurance policy which included a more limited use of talent-tests than Dworkin imagines,
then this becomes what the doctrine of equality of resources demands.7
At this stage in the argument, however, it might be objected that my reinterpretation of
the results of the insurance scenario cuts against Dworkin’s central norm, that we must
permit the distribution of resources at any moment to be ambition-sensitive but not
endowment-sensitive. Under the insurance scheme I have proposed (it might be argued)
7 Indeed, this is precisely the response made by Dworkin to my examples during an exchange at the
University of London School of Advanced Study symposium on Dworkin’s theory of equality held at Senate
House, London in March 2001.
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someone with moderate talents who has not the ambition to work hard will still get the
same income as someone with the same talents who chooses to earn his money by hard
work. Surely this violates the goal of ambition-sensitivity.
I reject the assumption that someone who chooses to work below his or her maximum
income potential is somehow not working hard. He or she could give up an income at the
thirtieth percentile in order to work in an animal rescue centre but still be working
tremendously hard. Be that as it may, the objection misses a more important point. The key
test of egalitarian justice for Dworkin is equal concern and respect, and equality of
resources is an interpretation of that abstract standard. Nevertheless, the core idea of
equality of resources, according to Dworkin, is ‘that people be made equal, so far as this is
possible, in their opportunity to insure or provide against bad luck before it has occurred,
or, if that is not possible, that people be awarded the compensation it is likely they would
have insured to have if they had had that opportunity’ (Dworkin 2003, p. 191). What
follows from this opportunity is a matter of option luck. So if people would, on average,
prefer a scheme that is less ambition-sensitive (in the sense suggested by the objection) than
Dworkin imagines, this can still be justified within the scope of equality of resources.
5 Implications
I have argued that the assumptions we make about the motivations of people under
conditions of equality can significantly alter the results of Dworkin’s thought experiment.
And I have suggested that people will be motivated by what they think is valuable in life
including not merely the opportunity cost of purchasing an insurance policy at a given price
but also the intrinsic and instrumental value of real occupational choice, privacy and the
avoidance of shameful revelation.
The foregoing arguments have important implications for social welfare policy. According
to Dworkin, the hypothetical argument for insurance coverage becomes compelling ‘well
above the level of income presently used to trigger payouts for unemployment or minimum
wage levels in either Britain or the United States’ (Dworkin 1981, p. 321; see also 2006, p.
118). The implication of the above argument is that there is a case for not simply increasing
the level at which insurance payouts are triggered in Britain and the United States but also
for significantly changing the terms on which people receive unemployment and low-wage
benefits. To put this into context, there has been over the past three decades an incremental
move away from social security towards workfare. Successive governments in the US,
Britain and various countries across Western Europe have introduced a barrage of new tests
and interviews, where claimants must now prove their inability to earn more than their
actual earnings as well as their willingness to actively seek employment or retraining as a
condition of receiving public assistance (see Brown 2009a, pp. 84–92). My argument is that
showing equal concern and respect for citizens might in fact demand that governments
reverse this policy trend. That realising equality of resources may require a social security
system in which people’s unemployment and low-wage benefits are based on their actual
earnings rather than their earning potential or evidence thereof.
I do not ignore key justifications for workfare policies, not least those appealing to the
values of fairness and reciprocity (see, for example, White 2003). However, I do wish to
suggest that these are not the only values; or at the very least, that there is a way of
understanding the meaning of these values that might tell against workfare. I am not the
first to make such a point. A similar point is implicit in the work of writers who defend
basic income schemes on grounds of real freedom for all (van Parijs 1995) or equal respect
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for persons (avoiding shameful revelation) (Hinton 2001). And the point is explicitly made by Paul
Bou-Habib and Serena Olsaretti, namely, ‘it is plausible that people have reason to prefer not
being required to accept any job that is offered to them, and that they should value freedom of
occupational choice enough to be prepared to pay a higher premium for a policy that guarantees it
to a greater extent than workfare policies do’ (2004, p. 263). The aim of the present article has
been to work through the implications of this train of thought within Dworkin’s account.
Now it might be pointed out that Dworkin himself recognises the possibility of using a
different tax and redistribution scheme than the one he himself thinks would follow from
the hypothetical insurance device. He writes:
We might decide that a tax scheme should differ from the best approximation of that
hypothetical market for other reasons. We might decide that a tax scheme so closely
modelled on that market is offensive to privacy, or too expensive in administrative
costs, or too inefficient in other ways. We might decide, for these or other reasons,
that a scheme that tied redistribution to actual earnings rather than to ability to earn,
for example, was a better second-best approximation to the ideal of mimicking the
insurance market than any other scheme we could develop. (Dworkin 1981, p. 326)
Notice, however, that in this passage Dworkin describes a scheme that ties redistribution to
actual earnings rather than ability to earn as a ‘second-best’ option. There are two problems
with this. First, it ignores the fact that further reflection about the motivation of parties to
the hypothetical insurance market might offer direct support for a scheme that ties
redistribution to actual earnings rather than to ability to earn. If my reflections are correct,
then such a scheme becomes a first-best approximation to the results of the hypothetical
insurance thought experiment. Second, to say that such a scheme is a second-best option
seems to concede that the demands of privacy and efficiency are in conflict with the ideal of
equality such that the latter must be compromised for the former. This is surely antithetical
to Dworkin’s rejection of value pluralism. What Dworkin should say, and what he actually
says in his later work, is that no government can claim to treat its citizens with equal
concern and respect that ignores their privacy or squanders vast sums of money on
expensive administration (2000, pp. 321–2; 2002, p. 126n.35; 2006, p. 110).
The above argument also has implications for civil liberties. Dworkin argues that there is
no justification for limiting the rights of ‘the rich’ to purchase private insurance to augment
their membership of compulsory social insurance schemes—private insurance that poorer
people cannot afford to purchase (Dworkin 2000, p. 437). As such, he attracts criticism
from those who suggests that holding onto this right frustrates his own egalitarian ambitions
(Armstrong 2005). It is important to recognise, however, that Dworkin defends liberty in
this case on the assumption that the government of the political community in question
lives up to the standards of equal concern and respect. Private health insurance is one
example but consider the case of private income-maintenance insurance. Why should a
government permit rich people to purchase such insurance that is unaffordable by poorer
people? One answer is that for a government to show equal concern and respect for its
citizens it must acknowledge the specific right to purchase private insurance (on the
assumption that this right exists). Another is that poorer people cannot reasonably object to
the existence of private insurance if they themselves have access to adequate social
insurance. I have argued that an adequate type of social insurance could extend even greater
advantages to the not so talented than Dworkin anticipates. Where this social insurance is in
place, why restrict the freedom of the more talented to purchase additional insurance?
Allowing the more talented to opt out of the social insurance scheme altogether is another
matter.
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I have not attempted in this article to scrutinise every aspect of Dworkin’s proposed
reconciliation of equality and liberty. Instead I have focused on the problem of the slavery
of the talent. I argued that whilst he is sensitive to the problem as it arises both in
connection with the initial auction and the collection of insurance premiums from talented
gamblers, he overlooks the potentially analogous lack of real freedom of occupation that
can adversely impact the not so talented given the tough rules he envisages for insurance
payouts. Here I found fault not with Dworkin’s theoretical architecture, but with the way he
interprets the likely results of his own thought experiment. It is open to debate whether
there are other objections to Dworkin’s reconciliation that are less easily diffused.8
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